Mental Simulation of Visceral States Affects Preferences and Behavior by Steinmetz, J. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Steinmetz, J. ORCID: 0000-0003-3299-4858, Tausen, B. M. and Risen, J. L. 
(2018). Mental Simulation of Visceral States Affects Preferences and Behavior. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44(3), pp. 406-417. doi: 10.1177/0146167217741315 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/20466/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167217741315
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167217741315
Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin
2018, Vol. 44(3) 406 –417
© 2017 by the Society for Personality
and Social Psychology, Inc
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI  10.1177/0 461672 7 41315
journals.sagepub.com/home/pspb
Article
Packing for winter travel can be difficult, and there are count-
less blogs offering tips for fitting big clothes into small suit-
cases. But if you are lucky enough to live somewhere warm, 
you may find it particularly challenging. Even if you have 
been to the destination before and know that you will need 
warm clothes, it can be hard to appreciate how many layers 
you will need to stop the cold and wind when you are cur-
rently comfortable in a t-shirt. Tourists who pack in the sun 
and then buy new hats and gloves in the snow demonstrate 
this forecasting error.
Preferences and behavior are influenced by a person’s 
current visceral state. For example, the same person will buy 
and eat more unhealthy food when hungry compared with 
when satiated (Nisbett & Kanouse, 1969; Read & van 
Leeuwen, 1998), and express different moral attitudes when 
sexually aroused compared with when in a neutral state 
(Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006). Although the influence of 
visceral states (which we define as attention-consuming 
bodily experiences, for example, hunger, cold; Loewenstein, 
1996; Risen & Critcher, 2011) is undeniable, people never-
theless often fail to accurately predict their preferences and 
behavior in different states (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).
Due to this cold-to-hot empathy gap (Loewenstein, 1996), 
people underestimate the influence of thirst or pain when they 
are not currently experiencing these states (Read & 
Loewenstein, 1999; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003; Van 
Boven, Loewenstein, Welch, & Dunning, 2012). The empathy 
gap can emerge when making judgments about the self or 
about others. Indeed, even when people have previous experi-
ence with a powerful visceral state, like pain, they show sur-
prisingly little ability to vividly recall the state or to predict 
how it affects someone (including themselves) when they are 
not currently experiencing it (Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, 
Prelec, & Shatto, 1998; Morley, 1993). Research has also 
demonstrated an empathy gap when people in a hot state try to 
predict what the absence of the state would be like. When 
warning fatigued people that their behavior might be driven by 
their tired state, they nevertheless underestimate its influence, 
unable to overcome the gap (Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van 
Harreveld, 2006). Biased by one’s current visceral state, this 
inability to sufficiently modify predictions for future prefer-
ences can result in suboptimal judgments and decisions.
Although simple manipulations such as warning people of 
visceral influences or recalling visceral states do not seem to 
help optimize predictions, deeper and more engaging mental 
simulation can substitute for actual experiences (Kappes & 
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Abstract
Preferences and behavior are heavily influenced by one’s current visceral experience, yet people often fail to anticipate such 
effects. Although research suggests that this gap is difficult to overcome—to act as if in another visceral state—research on 
mental simulation has demonstrated that simulations can substitute for experiences, albeit to a weaker extent. We examine 
whether mentally simulating visceral states can impact preferences and behavior. We show that simulating a specific visceral 
state (e.g., being cold or hungry) shifts people’s preferences for relevant activities (Studies 1a-2) and choices of food portion 
sizes (Study 3). Like actual visceral experiences, mental simulation only affects people’s current preferences but not their 
general preferences (Study 4). Finally, people project simulated states onto similar others, as is the case for actual visceral 
experiences (Study 5). Thus, mental simulation may help people anticipate their own and others’ future preferences, thereby 
improving their decision making.
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Morewedge, 2016). Mentally simulating an experience by 
imagining it in detail can evoke the same consequences as 
actually experiencing it, albeit to a lesser extent. Such simula-
tion-as-substitution has been demonstrated for a wide range 
of experiences. For example, mental rehearsal can substitute 
for the physical practice of playing music instruments or per-
forming complex surgeries (Cratty, 1984; Driskell, Copper, & 
Moran, 1994). Similarly, simulation of repeated food con-
sumption leads to habituation to the particular food that peo-
ple imagined consuming (Larson, Redden, & Elder, 2013; 
Morewedge, Huh, & Vosgerau, 2010).
Mental simulation can also give rise to similar physiologi-
cal effects as actual experience. Imagining a spider or a pain-
ful experience can increase sympathetic nervous system 
activation (Holmes & Mathews, 2010), and evoke corre-
sponding neural activity (Christian, Parkinson, Miles, 
Macrae, & Wheatley, 2015). Likewise, simulating sinking 
one’s teeth into a lemon can lead one’s mouth to fill with 
saliva (Keesman, Aarts, Vermeent, Häfner, & Papies, 2016). 
Unlike simply remembering a past experience or predicting 
one’s reactions to a future visceral state, engaging in deeper 
mental simulation provides an “imitative representation of 
some event” (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998, p. 430). 
By recruiting the same neural networks that accompany the 
actual experience (Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004; 
Jeannerod, 2001), simulations create plausible alternative 
realities by imagining concrete and specific events (Taylor & 
Schneider, 1989).
Given that mental simulation can induce analogous expe-
riential effects, mental simulation may help people predict 
their reactions to visceral states that they are not currently 
experiencing. For example, people might have difficulty 
imagining a sour flavor or being scared, but actively simulat-
ing touching a spider or biting into a lemon can indeed pro-
duce corresponding physiological changes (Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010; Keesman et al., 2016). If mental simulation 
can substitute to some extent for visceral experience, then 
people who actively simulate a given state (say, hunger) 
should report feeling it more than those who do not. And, if 
current feelings predict preferences and behavior, then simu-
lating hunger should lead people to be more interested in eat-
ing because they currently feel hungrier. If this is indeed the 
case, mental simulation might eventually help people to 
make more accurate predictions about themselves and others 
in alternative states. We provide a test of the first step by 
examining how mental simulation affects people’s current 
feelings, preferences, and behavior.
In addition to having people report on their current visceral 
states, we test whether mental simulation produces effects 
similar to those when actually experiencing a visceral state, 
and whether they are moderated by the same factors. For 
example, we expect someone who is feeling cold to be espe-
cially interested in drinking a warm beverage at that moment 
but not to be permanently more excited about drinking coffee 
or tea. By extension, if simulating a particular visceral state 
leads people to momentarily experience it to some extent, 
then current preferences but not general preferences should 
be affected. Beyond temporal distance, social distance 
appears to be a boundary condition of projecting visceral 
states. In particular, research has demonstrated that people 
project their current visceral experiences onto similar but not 
onto dissimilar others (O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012). 
Analogously, visceral states experienced as a result of mental 
simulation should be more readily projected onto similar 
rather than dissimilar others.
The Present Research
We test whether actively simulating a visceral state might 
evoke similar feelings to the actual experience, thereby shift-
ing people’s preferences and behavior. In Studies 1a and 1b, 
we test whether simulating warmth (vs. cold) decreases peo-
ple’s preferences for warming activities, and whether this 
effect exceeds the effect of priming warmth and cold. In 
Study 2, we replicate and extend this effect by testing whether 
simulating being hungry (vs. full) affects people’s prefer-
ences for relevant satiating activities. In Study 3, we test 
whether simulating being hungry (vs. full) leads people to 
choose larger food portions. To determine whether simula-
tions, such as visceral states, specifically inform one’s cur-
rent preferences, in Study 4, we examine whether simulating 
being hungry (vs. full or a neutral condition) affects momen-
tary but not general preferences. Finally, in Study 5, we test 
whether people project their simulated visceral states when 
making judgments about similar and dissimilar others.
Study 1a
In Study 1a, we tested whether mental simulation of visceral 
states can shift people’s current preferences. We provided 
people with concrete and specific cues (i.e., pictures) to 
facilitate mental simulation.
Method
Participants and design. We recruited 119 students (65 female, 
Mage = 20.50, SD = 4.89) at a North American university for 
a one-factorial (simulate cold vs. warmth) between-subjects 
design. We predetermined a sample size of at least 50 partici-
pants per condition, based on power analysis of an estimated 
effect size of d = 0.55 and a desired power of .80 with an 
alpha level of .05 (IJzerman, Schrama, & Pronk, 2016; Stein-
metz & Posten, 2017), and collected some more data as data 
collection went faster than anticipated. Thus, we had 84% 
power for detecting a medium effect of d = 0.55, but 36% 
power for detecting a small effect of d = 0.30. For all studies, 
we report all measures and manipulations, and explain how 
sample sizes were determined. No data were excluded from 
analyses in any of the studies. For all materials and data, see 
https://osf.io/thf4v/
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Materials and procedure. To simulate cold or warmth, partici-
pants imagined themselves in a picture for 30 s that depicted 
a very cold versus very warm environment (glacier/snowy 
landscape vs. desert/lava lake). After the 30 s, participants 
reported how vivid their mental imagery was (1 = not very 
vivid, 9 = very vivid) and described what they had imagined 
(Steinmetz & Posten, 2017).
Next, participants indicated their preferences for different 
consumer goods and activities in fully randomized order 
(Zhang & Risen, 2014). Five items were preferences between 
cold and warm activities (e.g., “Right now, I would prefer 
. . .” 1 = taking a hot bath, 9 = taking a cool, refreshing shower; 
reverse coded). The other five items were preferences between 
neutral temperature activities to mask the questionnaire’s pur-
pose. Our dependent measure was the average of the five tem-
perature-related preferences (α = .64), with higher values 
indicating a stronger preference for warming activities.
Finally, we asked participants how they currently felt (1 = 
very cold, 9 = very warm) in addition to four filler items 
(tired, awake, thirsty, hungry). For exploratory reasons, par-
ticipants estimated the temperature of the lab room they were 
in (open-ended item). There were no differences between the 
warm and cold condition in the room temperature estimates 
in the vividness of participants’ mental imagery, or in how 
hungry or tired participants felt, all ps > .267.1
Results and Discussion
Participants in the cold condition preferred more warming 
activities (M = 6.23, SD = 1.52) than participants in the warm 
condition (M = 5.19, SD = 1.73), t(117) = 3.501, p = .001, d 
= 0.64. Participants in the cold condition also felt less warm 
(M = 5.11, SD = 1.72) than participants in the warm condi-
tion (M = 5.79, SD = 1.36), t(117) = 2.375, p = .019, d = 0.44.
The colder the participants felt, the stronger their prefer-
ences for warming activities, β = .256, SE = 0.096, t(117) = 
2.755, p = .007, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.074, 
0.455]. A regression analysis predicting preferences from 
condition (simulate warm or cold) and how warm partici-
pants felt revealed a significant effect of condition, β = .906, 
SE = 0.301, t(116) = 3.013, p = .003, 95% CI = [0.311, 
1.502], and a significant effect of how warm participants felt, 
β = −.203, SE = 0.095, t(116) = 2.136, p = .035, 95% CI = 
[0.015, 0.391].2 Although marginal, participants’ feelings of 
warmth partially mediated the effect of condition (95% CI = 
[−0.057, 0.199], 1,000 bootstrapping samples), Sobel’s z = 
1.80, p = .072.
Study 1a provides evidence that mentally simulating 
being in a very cold environment makes people more inter-
ested in warming activities, at least in part because actively 
simulating being cold made them feel colder in the moment.
Study 1b
In Study 1b, we replicated Study 1a. In addition, we tested 
whether the effects of mentally simulating visceral states are 
stronger than the effects of priming visceral states. Some pre-
vious literature has found that priming visceral states shifts 
people’s preferences (Shalev, 2014), whereas other literature 
has found no such effects (Zhang & Risen, 2014). Thus, we 
expected mental simulations of warmth versus cold to affect 
participants’ preferences (as in Study 1a), and expected an 
attenuation or elimination of this effect when priming 
warmth versus cold.
Method
Participants and design. We recruited 242 participants (90 
female, Mage = 34.30, SD = 9.86) on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk for a 2 (simulation vs. priming) × 2 (cold vs. warm) 
between-subjects design. To be consistent with the sample 
size of Study 1a, we predetermined a sample size of 60 par-
ticipants per condition. Our sample provided 85% power for 
detecting a medium effect (d = 0.55) and 37% power for 
detecting a small effect (d = 0.30).
Materials and procedure. In the simulation conditions, we 
used the same procedure and materials as in Study 1a. Par-
ticipants imagined themselves in a picture of a cold versus 
warm environment for 30 s, and afterward described what 
they had imagined. In the priming conditions, participants 
looked at one of the pictures for 30 s but were asked to judge 
the picture’s quality by forming an impression of its colors 
and resolution. Afterward, participants wrote about their 
judgment. Thereby, we ensured that primed participants 
would focus their attention on the picture to a similar extent 
to those in the simulation conditions.
Next, participants responded to the same preference items 
as in Study 1a in fully randomized order. Our dependent 
measure was the average of the five temperature-related 
choices (simulation conditions: α = .64; priming conditions: 
α = .54), with higher values indicating a stronger preference 
for warming activities.
We asked participants how they currently felt (1 = very 
cold, 9 = very warm) in addition to four filler items (tired, 
awake, thirsty, hungry). As a manipulation check, we asked 
all participants to what extent they had imagined themselves 
in the environment when looking at the picture (1 = not at 
all, 9 = very much). Finally, participants estimated the tem-
perature of the room they were in (open-ended item).
There were no differences between the warm and cold 
conditions in the room temperature estimates, or in how 
thirsty, tired, or awake participants felt, all ps > .163.3
Results and Discussion
For the manipulation check, we found the expected main 
effect of simulation versus priming, F(1, 238) = 124.700, p 
< .001, η2 = .344. Participants in the simulation conditions 
imagined themselves in the pictures more than primed par-
ticipants did (simulation cold: M = 8.28, SD = 1.25; simula-
tion warm: M = 8.24, SD = 1.43; priming cold: M = 5.48, 
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SD = 2.89; priming warm: M = 4.75, SD = 2.56). There was 
no main effect of warm versus cold pictures, F(1, 238) = 
1.914, p = .168, η2 = .008, and also no interaction effect, 
F(1, 238) = 1.544, p = .215, η2 = .006.
Turning to preferences, participants in the cold conditions 
preferred more warming activities than participants in the 
warm conditions, F(1, 238) = 17.639, p < .001, η2 = .069. 
There was no main effect of simulation versus priming, F(1, 
238) = 0.045, p = .832, η2 < .001. Importantly, we found a 
marginally significant interaction for simulation versus prim-
ing with the warm versus cold pictures, F(1, 238) = 3.549, p 
= .061, η2 = .015. More specifically, in the simulation condi-
tions, we replicated Study 1a. Participants in the cold condi-
tion (M = 6.09, SD = 1.72) preferred more warming activities 
than participants in the warm condition (M = 4.66, SD = 
1.94), p < .001, d = 0.78. Although the same pattern emerged 
from the priming conditions (cold: M = 5.70, SD = 1.65; 
warm: M = 5.16, SD = 1.96), it was less pronounced, p = 
.097, d = 0.30.
For participants’ feelings of warmth, we found no main 
effect of simulation versus priming, F(1, 238) = 1.975, p = 
.161, η2 = .008, or of the warm versus cold pictures, F(1, 
238) = 0.909, p = .341, η2 = .004. We also found no interac-
tion effect, F(1, 238) = 1.275, p = .533, η2 = .002. Yet, the 
pattern of results is in the expected direction. Participants 
who simulated being in a cold environment (M = 5.31, SD 
= 2.10) felt somewhat (but not significantly) colder than 
those who simulated being in a warm environment (M = 
5.68, SD = 1.56), p = .274, d = 0.20. As mentioned above, 
our sample only provided 37% power for detecting a small 
effect (d = 0.30). This pattern disappeared in the priming 
conditions (cold: M = 5.79, SD = 1.79; warm: M = 5.86, SD 
= 1.79), p = .813, d = 0.04. Due to the lack of direct effect 
on participants’ feelings in the simulation condition, cur-
rent feelings did not mediate the effect of simulation on 
preferences.
Study 1b provides evidence that mentally simulating vis-
ceral states elicits stronger corresponding preferences than 
priming these states.
Study 2
In Study 2, we tested whether people can simulate visceral 
states without pictures, and whether preferences match the 
specific state being simulated. Research shows that experi-
encing one visceral state does not help overcome the empa-
thy gap for other visceral states. For example, fatigued 
people found sleep deprivation more harmful than nonfa-
tigued people, but they did not differ in their evaluation of 
cold-induced discomfort (Nordgren, McDonnell, & 
Loewenstein, 2011). Thus, we predict that simulating cold 
affects preferences for warming but not filling activities, and 
that simulating hunger affects preferences for filling but not 
warming activities.
Method
Participants and design. We recruited 300 participants (140 
female, Mage = 34.21, SD = 10.57) on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk for a 2 (state: satiation vs. temperature) × 2 (high vs. 
low intensity of the state; full/warm vs. hungry/cold) 
between-subjects design. Again, we predetermined a sample 
size of at least 50 participants per condition, and collected 
more data as we had additional funds available. Our sample 
provided 92% power for detecting a medium effect (d = 
0.55) and 45% power for detecting a small effect (d = 0.30).
Materials and procedure. To simulate cold, warmth, hunger, 
or satiation, participants read the following instructions:
For the next 60 seconds, please imagine that you are very HOT 
[versus cold, hungry, or full]. Please think about what it would 
be like to feel very hot in as much detail as possible. Think about 
what your experience would be like: What would you be 
thinking about? How would your body feel? How would you 
act? Please try to give us a detailed description of your thoughts 
and feelings. (modeled after Keesman et al., 2016)
During these 60 s, participants wrote about their thoughts 
and feelings. After 60 s, participants could either continue 
writing or proceed.
Participants worked on the same preferences question-
naire as in Studies 1a and 1b, in which five items (α = .63) 
indicated a stronger preference for warming activities. To 
test whether simulating hunger affects participants’ prefer-
ences for filling activities, we added five items (α = .56) 
about filling activities (e.g., “Right now, I would prefer . . .” 
1 = going on a date to a movie, 9 = going on a date to a res-
taurant). Higher values indicated a stronger preference for 
filling activities. Participants responded to all 15 items in 
fully randomized order (five warmth-related items, five sati-
ation-related items, five fillers).
Finally, we asked participants how hot or cold, full or 
hungry, thirsty or quenched, and tired or energized they felt. 
Then, we asked participants how vivid their mental imagery 
in the simulation task had been and to what extent they had 
engaged with the simulation task. There were no differences 
between the warm and cold condition, or the hungry and full 
condition on any of these items, all ps > .100.
Results and Discussion
As predicted, a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with visceral state and 
intensity as between-subjects factors and preferences for 
warming versus filling activities as a within-subjects factor 
revealed a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 297) = 
36.112, p < .001, η2 = .108.4 Next, we examined preferences 
for warming and filling activities separately.
Replicating Studies 1a and 1b, participants who simulated 
being hot had weaker preferences for warming activities (M 
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= 4.93, SD = 1.78) than participants who simulated being 
cold (M = 7.33, SD = 1.44), F(1, 297) = 84.271, p < .001, η2 
= .221. There was no difference in preferences for warming 
activities between participants who simulated being hungry 
(M = 6.13, SD = 1.69) versus being full (M = 6.24, SD = 
1.46), F(1, 297) = 0.173, p = .678, η2 = .001. Furthermore, 
we found a significant interaction of state and intensity, F(1, 
297) = 46.182, p < .001, η2 = .135.
We also examined whether the simulation effect on pref-
erences for warming activities was mediated by currently 
feeling warm. Participants who simulated being warm felt 
warmer (M = 4.95, SD = 1.28) than participants who simu-
lated being cold (M = 4.13, SD = 1.45), F(1, 296) = 11.524, 
p < .001, η2 = .037. The colder the participants felt, the 
stronger their preferences for warm activities, β = −0.578, 
SE = 0.105, t(148) = −5.491, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.786, 
−0.370]. A regression predicting preferences for warming 
activities that includes condition and current feelings of 
warmth revealed a significant effect of simulation, β = 
2.163, SE = 0.256, t(148) = 8.441, p < .001, 95% CI = 
[1.657, 2.670], and a significant effect of feeling warm, β = 
−0.359, SE = 0.090, t(148) = −3.972, p < .001, 95% CI = 
[−0.538, −0.180]. Moreover, feelings of warmth mediated 
the effect of simulation on preferences for warming activi-
ties (95% CI = [−0.507, −0.107], 1,000 bootstrapping sam-
ples), Sobel’s z = 3.033, p = .002.
Turning to preferences for filling activities, participants 
who simulated being hungry had stronger preferences for 
filling activities (M = 5.57, SD = 1.82) than participants who 
simulated being full (M = 4.32, SD = 1.97), F(1, 297) = 
19.089, p < .001, η2 = .060. However, participants who simu-
lated being cold also had stronger preferences for filling 
activities (M = 5.83, SD = 1.64) than participants who simu-
lated being warm (M = 5.17, SD = 1.57), F(1, 297) = 3.087, 
p = .023, η2 = .017. Thus, we found no significant interaction 
of state and intensity, F(1, 297) = 2.157, p = .143, η2 = .007.
Next, we tested whether the simulation effect on prefer-
ences for filling activities was mediated by currently feeling 
hungry. Participants who simulated being hungry felt hungrier 
(M = 5.17, SD = 2.34) than participants who simulated being 
full (M = 4.00, SD = 2.10), F(1, 296) = 10.129, p = .002, η2 = 
.033. The hungrier participants felt, the stronger their prefer-
ences for filling activities, β = .463, SE = 0.060, t(150) = 7.721, 
p < .001, 95% CI = [0.345, 0.582]. A regression predicting 
preferences for filling activities that included condition and 
feelings of hunger revealed a significant effect of simulation, β 
= .758, SE = 0.278, t(150) = 2.726, p = .007, 95% CI = [0.208, 
1.307], and a significant effect of feeling hungry, β = .421, SE 
= 0.061, t(150) = 6.928, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.301, 0.541]. 
Feelings of hunger mediated the effect of simulation on prefer-
ences for filling activities (95% CI = [0.178, 0.847], 1,000 
bootstrapping samples), Sobel’s z = 2.979, p = .003.
In addition to the predicted effects, we found an unex-
pected effect of simulating being warm versus cold on par-
ticipants’ preferences for filling activities, partially mediated 
by their slightly increased feelings of hunger. Specifically, 
participants who simulated being cold felt marginally hun-
grier (M = 5.07, SD = 2.35) than participants who simulated 
being warm (M = 4.37, SD = 2.21), F(1, 296) = 3.543, p = 
.061, η2 = .012. And when simulating warmth versus cold, 
the hungrier participants felt, the stronger their preferences 
for filling activities, β = .202, SE = 0.056, t(148) = 3.594, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [0.091, 0.313]. A regression predicting pref-
erences for filling activities that included condition (warm 
vs. cold) and feelings of hunger revealed a significant effect 
of simulation, β = .544, SE = 0.258, t(148) = 2.104, p = .037, 
95% CI = [0.033, 1.055], and a significant effect of feeling 
hungry, β = .184, SE = 0.056, t(148) = 3.275, p = .001, 95% 
CI = [0.073, 0.295]. Feelings of hunger partially mediated 
the effect of simulation on preferences for filling activities 
(95% CI = [0.002, 0.364], 1,000 bootstrapping samples), 
Sobel’s z = 1.650, p = .099. It is possible that this effect is 
related to the finding in animal research that cold can induce 
hunger, whereas warmth leads to (relative) satiation (Zhang 
& Wang, 2006; Zhao, 2011) due to the greater energy expen-
diture in colder climates, which requires increased calorie 
intake. However, future research is necessary to ascertain the 
robustness (or spuriousness) of this particular effect.
Study 2 replicated the effects from Studies 1a and 1b for 
temperature but without requiring pictures to facilitate the 
simulation process. The results also generalize our earlier 
findings to show that mentally simulating different visceral 
states can affect preferences. Furthermore, the results pro-
vide additional evidence that simulation can work through 
substitution—the effects on preferences are state specific 
and are mediated by current feelings for the state that people 
simulated.
Study 3
Study 3 tested whether mental simulation affects actual 
(rather than hypothetical) choices of food portion sizes.
Method
Participants and design. We recruited 111 community partici-
pants (64 female, Mage = 37.44, SD = 15.63) at a North Amer-
ican museum for a 2 (simulate being hungry vs. full) 
between-subjects design. Again, we predetermined a sample 
size of at least 50 participants per condition, and were able to 
recruit some more participants on the designated data collec-
tion days. Our sample provided 81% power for detecting a 
medium effect (d = 0.55) and 34% power for detecting a 
small effect (d = 0.30).
Materials and procedure. Participants simulated being hungry 
versus full with the same procedure as in Study 2. Next, par-
ticipants made six consumer choices about the same item in 
different sizes. Critically, we told participants that they 
would receive one of their selected choices in the selected 
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size after the study. Thus, participants knew that one of their 
choices would determine their actual reward. Three of the six 
choices were about different sizes of snack food items (pop-
corn, chocolate ice cream, potato chips, α = .66), whereas the 
other three items were fillers (notepad, picture frame, tooth-
paste). For each item, participants chose between a small, 
medium, or large item, or nothing (e.g., 1 = small popcorn, 2 
= medium popcorn, 3 = large popcorn, 0 = no popcorn).
Finally, we asked participants how they currently felt 
(hot/cold, full/hungry, thirsty/quenched, tired/energized), 
and how long ago they had last eaten something (a snack or 
a full meal). There were no differences between the hungry 
and full condition on any of these items, all ps > .205.
Results and Discussion
We combined the size choices for the three food items. 
Participants who simulated being hungry chose larger food 
portion sizes (M = 2.33, SD = 0.86) than participants who 
simulated being full (M = 1.88, SD = 0.71), t(109) = 3.031, p 
= .003, d = 0.57.5 The hungrier participants felt, the larger 
their chosen food portions, β = 0.137, SE = 0.031, t(110) = 
4.346, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.074, 0.199].6 Unlike Studies 1a 
and 2, there was no direct effect of simulation condition on 
how hungry participants felt (hungry: M = 4.62, SD = 2.32; 
full: M = 4.07, SD = 2.25), t(109) = 1.261, p = .210, d = 0.24, 
though it was in the predicted direction). As mentioned 
above, our sample only provided 34% power for detecting a 
small effect (d = 0.30). Consequently, how hungry partici-
pants felt did not mediate the effect of simulation condition 
on choices.
Whereas Studies 1a and 2 demonstrated that mentally 
simulating visceral states can affect how much interest peo-
ple express for various activities, Study 3 showed that it can 
affect real choices with immediate consequences.
Study 4
In Study 4, we tested a boundary condition to gain insight 
into the underlying mechanism. We expected that simulation 
alters current experiences, which people use when determin-
ing their current preferences but not when reporting their 
general preferences. People have difficulty reporting their 
preferences in different visceral states (Loewenstein et al., 
1998), presumably because their current preferences are 
heavily influenced by their current experiences. However, 
people can reliably report their general, stable preferences 
(Van Haitsma et al., 2014), which are determined by numer-
ous other factors (Galef, 1996; Rozin, 2006). Thus, we 
expect that people’s current but not general preferences are 
affected by their current (real or simulated) visceral experi-
ences. Such results would suggest that people rely on mental 
simulations the way they rely on the actual experience of 
visceral states when inferring their current preferences 
(“What activity do I currently feel like?”), while basing their 
general preferences on other factors (“What do I usually 
like?”).
In this study, we included a neutral control condition to 
test whether simulating being full or being hungry exerted a 
similar influence on people’s preferences.
Method
Participants and design. We recruited 405 participants (165 
female, Mage = 34.62, SD = 11.56) on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk for a 3 (state: hungry vs. full vs. control) × 2 (timing: 
now vs. in general) between-subjects design. Again, we pre-
determined a sample size of at least 50 participants per con-
dition, and collected more data as we had additional funds 
available. Our sample provided 88% power for detecting a 
medium effect (d = 0.55) and 41% power for detecting a 
small effect (d = 0.30).
Materials and procedure. The simulation procedure was iden-
tical to Studies 2 and 3. Participants imagined, for at least 60 
s, being hungry or being full. In the control condition, par-
ticipants imagined one of two neutral activities (traveling to 
a different city vs. playing with a childhood toy).
To measure participants’ momentary versus general pref-
erences, they worked on the same filling activities question-
naire as in Study 2. Five items measured their preference for 
filling activities (α = .67 for momentary preferences, α = .48 
for general preferences), in random order, mixed with five 
neutral filler items. To vary the timing, participants either 
responded in the same wording as in Study 2 (i.e., “Right 
now, I would prefer . . .”) or reported their general prefer-
ences (i.e., “I would always prefer . . .”).
Finally, we asked participants how they currently felt (hot/
cold, full/hungry, thirsty/quenched, tired/energized), how 
vivid their mental imagery had been, and to what extent they 
had engaged with the simulation task. There were no effects 
of the simulation condition on vividness or on engagement, or 
on how thirsty or tired participants felt, all ps > .436.7
Results and Discussion
For participants’ preferences, we found a significant main 
effect of simulation, F(2, 399) = 56.249, p < .001, η2 = .098, 
and a marginally significant main effect of timing, F(1, 399) 
= 3.517, p = .061, η2 = .009. The main effects were qualified 
by the predicted interaction of simulation and timing, F(2, 
399) = 19.791, p < .001, η2 = .090.
For momentary preferences, we replicated Study 2. When 
participants simulated being hungry, they had stronger pref-
erences for filling activities (M = 6.30, SD = 1.63) than when 
they simulated being full (M = 3.89, SD = 1.73), p < .001, d 
= 1.43. Preferences for filling activities in the control condi-
tion (M = 5.55, SD = 1.64) were weaker than those in the 
hungry condition, p = .009, d = 0.46, but stronger than those 
in the full condition, p < .001, d = 0.98.8
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In contrast, as predicted, we found no effect of simulation 
on participants’ general preferences. When participants sim-
ulated being hungry, they had almost identical general pref-
erences for filling activities (M = 5.49, SD = 1.55) as when 
they simulated being full (M = 5.48, SD = 1.54), p = .971, d 
= 0.01. Preferences in the control condition (M = 5.69, SD = 
1.56) were similar to the hungry condition, p = .474, d = 
0.13, and to the full condition, p = .450, d = 0.14.
For participants’ feelings of hunger, we found a significant 
main effect of simulation, F(2, 399) = 54.799, p < .001, η2 = 
.064. We found no effect of timing, F(1, 399) = 0.980, p = 
.323, η2 = .002, and no significant interaction, F(2, 399) = 
2.327, p = .099, η2 = .012. Thus, mental simulation affected 
participants’ current experience of hunger, regardless of 
whether they reported their current or general preferences. 
Specifically, in the current preferences condition, when par-
ticipants simulated being hungry, they felt hungrier (M = 
5.38, SD = 2.16) than when they simulated being full (M = 
3.74, SD = 1.88), p < .001, d = 0.81. The control condition fell 
in between (M = 4.82, SD = 2.06), with participants feeling 
similarly hungry as in the hungry condition, p = .124, d = 
0.27, but hungrier than in the full condition, p = .002, d = 
0.55. In the general preferences condition, when participants 
simulated being hungry, they felt hungrier (M = 5.00, SD = 
1.90) than when they simulated being full (M = 4.13, SD = 
1.99), p = .013, d = 0.45. The control condition again fell in 
between (M = 4.21, SD = 2.09), with participants feeling sim-
ilarly hungry as in the full condition, p = .832, d = 0.04, but 
less hungry than in the hungry condition, p = .023, d = 0.40.
Although simulation affected participants’ current feeling 
of hunger in both conditions, we expected participants to use 
their feelings of hunger only to determine their current pref-
erences but not their general preferences. To test this predic-
tion, we ran separate mediation models for the momentary 
and general preferences conditions.9
In the momentary preferences condition, the hungrier 
the participants felt, the stronger their preferences for fill-
ing activities, β = .488, SE = 0.054, t(200) = 8.963, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [0.381, 0.596]. When controlling for feeling 
hungry, the effect of simulation became marginally signifi-
cant, β = −.283, SE = 0.146, t(200) = −1.939, p = .054, 95% 
CI = [−0.571, 0.005], whereas feeling hungry remained a 
significant predictor of participants’ preferences, β = .475, 
SE = 0.055, t(200) = 8.714, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.368, 
0.583]. How hungry participants felt partially mediated the 
effect of simulation on momentary preferences (95% CI = 
[−0.361, 0.005], 1,000 bootstrapping samples), Sobel’s z = 
−1.729, p = .084.
We found no effect of simulation on participants’ general 
preferences, so that computing a mediation analysis would 
be uninformative. Moreover, hungrier participants did not 
report stronger general preferences for filling activities, β = 
.067, SE = 0.054, t(202) = 1.241, p = .216, 95% CI = [−0.039, 
0.172]. Thus, feelings of hunger informed participants’ cur-
rent but not general preferences.
Study 4 showed again that simulating a visceral state can 
affect people’s preferences by making them feel like they are 
experiencing the state. The control condition in this study 
highlighted that simulating feeling hungry and full can both 
affect a person’s current state and thereby his or her momen-
tary preferences. Importantly, mental simulation affected 
feelings of hunger for people in both the momentary and the 
general preferences condition. However, simulation only 
affected momentary (but not general) preferences. Thus, 
feelings of hunger were only relied upon in the momentary 
preferences condition.
If our manipulation had an effect because participants had 
the theory that simulation should affect their preferences 
(e.g., experimental demand), then there should be an effect 
across conditions. Instead, if simulating a visceral state 
affected people’s feelings, then they should respond as if 
they were actually feeling hungry or full. The results sup-
ported the latter interpretation—just like hunger affects cur-
rent preferences for eating but not general preferences, we 
found that simulating hunger affected current but not general 
preferences.
We directly tested participants’ theories for how simula-
tion would affect their preferences to address concerns of 
experimental demand. We recruited a separate sample of 114 
Amazon Mechanical Turk participants (53 female, Mage = 
36.79, SD = 13.42). Participants reported how they thought 
someone who had just mentally simulated being hungry ver-
sus being full (between subjects) for 1 min would behave. 
Specifically, all participants indicated what they thought the 
person would prefer on the same five momentary preferences 
for filling activities items (α = .92) and five general prefer-
ences for filling activities items (α = .88), in addition to the 
same filler items. Participants predicted that the person 
would show stronger momentary preferences for filling 
activities after having simulated being hungry (M = 7.11, SD 
= 1.74) compared with being full (M = 3.96, SD = 2.21), 
t(112) = 8.478, p < .001, d = 1.584. Thus, participants cor-
rectly anticipated the effects of simulation on momentary 
preferences. However, participants also predicted that the 
person would show stronger general preferences for filling 
activities after having simulated being hungry (M = 6.48, SD 
= 1.72) compared with being full (M = 4.43, SD = 2.01), 
t(111) = 5.848, p < .001, d = 1.096. Contrary to our findings, 
participants’ lay theories suggested that simulation would 
also affect general preferences. Had experimental demand 
caused our effects in Study 4, mental simulation should have 
affected participants’ general preferences.
Study 5
In Study 5, we tested whether simulating visceral states also 
affects people’s predictions about other people’s visceral 
states. The literature suggests that people project their cur-
rent visceral experiences onto others (Van Boven & 
Loewenstein, 2003). We expected that the same holds when 
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simulating visceral states, as simulations can affect current 
states (as we have shown in our earlier studies). We further 
tested whether projection of simulated states is moderated by 
the perceived similarity to the other person. Research has 
shown that people project their visceral states onto similar, 
but not dissimilar, others (O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012). We 
expected the same pattern for projection of simulated vis-
ceral states. If this is indeed the case, the effects of simulated 
visceral states on judgments would very closely resemble the 
effects of actual visceral experiences. Such a finding would 
further support the notion of simulation as substitution, and 
thereby demonstrate the potential of mental simulation to 
overcome notoriously persistent empathy gaps.
Method
Participants and design. We recruited 200 participants (93 
female, Mage = 34.26, SD = 10.26) on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk for a 2 (state: hungry vs. full) × 2 (other person: similar 
vs. dissimilar) between-subjects design. Again, we predeter-
mined a sample size of at least 50 participants per condition. 
Our sample provided 78% power for detecting a medium 
effect (d = 0.55) and 32% power for detecting a small effect 
(d = 0.30).
Materials and procedure. First, participants were asked to 
provide the name of someone they knew personally who was 
either very similar or very dissimilar to them. We further 
specified that the person should not currently be in the same 
location as the participant (to prevent people from simply 
asking the other person about their current feelings). Partici-
pants read that they would be asked a few questions about 
that person but would first work on another task. With this 
question order, participants immediately responded to the 
projection items after the simulation task without requiring 
further instructions. Participants followed the simulation 
procedure, which was identical to Studies 2 to 4. For at least 
60 s, participants imagined being hungry or being full.
Next, participants were asked to guess how the person 
they named earlier is currently feeling on four items (in ran-
domized order). On the critical item, participants reported 
whether they thought the other person was currently feeling 
full or hungry (1 = very full, 9 = very hungry). As fillers, 
participants additionally reported how thirsty versus 
quenched, hot versus cold, and tired versus energized they 
thought the other person was feeling.10 Finally, as a manipu-
lation check, participants reported how similar they felt to 
the other person (1 = very similar, 9 = very dissimilar). 
Participants felt more similar to the other person in the simi-
lar condition (M = 7.04, SD = 1.46) compared with the dis-
similar condition (M = 3.26, SD = 1.84), t(198) = 16.007, p < 
.001, d = 2.276. Note that we did not ask participants how 
hungry or full they were currently feeling to avoid potential 
carryover effects from the item asking how hungry or full the 
other person was feeling.
Results and Discussion
For the other person’s (projected) feelings of hunger, we 
found no main effect of simulation, F(1, 196) = 0.374, p = 
.541, η2 = .002, or of similarity (vs. dissimilarity), F(1, 196) 
= 0.118, p = .732, η2 = .001. However, as expected, we found 
a significant interaction of simulation and similarity, F(1, 
196) = 6.657, p = .011, η2 = .033.
Participants projected their simulated visceral state onto 
similar others. Participants who simulated being hungry 
thought that the similar other was hungrier (M = 5.37, SD = 
1.84) than participants who simulated being full (M = 4.53, 
SD = 1.97), p = .028, d = 0.44. In contrast, participants did 
not project their simulated visceral states onto dissimilar oth-
ers. Participants who simulated being hungry perceived the 
dissimilar other (M = 4.78, SD = 1.90) to be equally hungry 
(or, if anything, less hungry) as participants who simulated 
being full (M = 5.30, SD = 1.72), p = .157, d = 0.29.
In Study 5, participants who simulated hunger responded 
as though they were actually hungry. Namely, participants 
perceived another person to be hungrier—but only when 
that person was similar to them. Because we did not mea-
sure participants’ own feelings of hunger (to avoid carryover 
effects), we can only assume that our results emerge because 
participants projected their own experienced hunger onto 
the other person. Nevertheless, these results provide addi-
tional evidence that simulating a visceral experience can 
lead to behavior that closely resembles having the visceral 
experience.
General Discussion
In six studies, we show that people are able to mentally simu-
late visceral states. These simulated experiences appear to 
substitute for actual visceral experiences, affecting prefer-
ences (Studies 1a-2) and behavior (Study 3). People use the 
feelings that result from simulated experiences to infer their 
current preferences but not their general preferences (Study 
4). Furthermore, people project their simulated experiences 
onto similar but not onto dissimilar others (Study 5).
Mental simulation of visceral states affects preferences 
and behavior (at least in part) because people’s feelings (e.g., 
of hunger and cold) are also affected. We found that people’s 
self-reported feelings (partially) mediate the effects of simu-
lation on preferences and behavior in our studies, except for 
Studies 1b and 3. One reason why we did not consistently 
find a mediating effect of feelings on preferences and behav-
ior might be that we lacked the statistical power to detect a 
small effect. Indeed, the effect size for current feelings was 
small or small/medium in all studies (Study 1a: d = 0.44, 
Study 1b: d = 0.20, Study 2: η2 = .033 and .037; Study 3: d = 
0.24; Study 4: η2 = .064). Thus, we conducted a single-paper 
meta-analysis (McShane & Böckenholt, 2017) across all of 
our studies in which we measured participants’ current feel-
ings (Studies 1a-4). This meta-analysis showed an overall 
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significant effect of simulation on current feelings at 0.87 
(SE = 0.13; z = 6.48, p < .001). We conclude that simulation 
affects current feelings, which (at least partly) explains why 
simulation also affects preferences and behavior. We also 
conducted a meta-analysis of simulation on preferences and 
behavior, which showed an overall significant effect at 1.50 
(SE = 0.33; z = 4.53, p < .001).
Note that mere compliance with experimental demand 
would lead to different predictions. Although we acknowl-
edge that some of our findings might partly originate from 
experimental demand, we took great care to address this con-
cern. By using consequential choices in Study 3, we render 
compliance with perceived demand unattractive, as people 
would in many cases have to forego their desired food por-
tion size to comply with perceived demand. Thus, we believe 
that the costs of compliance with perceived demand in Study 
3 exceed the potential benefits, making it unlikely to drive 
behavior. Neither can experimental demand explain why 
simulation failed to affect general preferences in Study 4. If 
people wanted to give presumably desirable answers, they 
would report stronger general preferences for filling activi-
ties after having simulated hunger. Such a finding would be 
in line with people’s lay theories on how simulation affects 
general preferences, as we demonstrated in our follow-up to 
Study 4. Thus, we contend that demand is unlikely to be 
responsible for our effects in Study 4, given that the pattern 
of results following simulation was different from that in 
people’s lay theories. Finally, in Study 5, compliance with 
experimental demand would presumably lead people to proj-
ect their simulated experience onto all others. Taking simi-
larity into account to comply with experimental demand 
requires a more sophisticated understanding of social psy-
chology than most people have. Yet, as simulation affected 
people’s current behavior and preferences but not their gen-
eral preferences and affected their projection onto similar but 
not dissimilar others, we conclude that experimental demand 
cannot explain our findings as a whole.
Our results demonstrate that simulation not only substi-
tutes for sensorimotor experiences (Kappes & Morewedge, 
2016) but can also substitute for the experience of visceral 
states. Previous literature has long argued that one’s current 
state is extremely difficult to overcome when trying to imag-
ine alternate visceral states (Loewenstein et al., 1998). 
Indeed, without concrete cues, people may fail to generate a 
realistic representation of a visceral state (e.g., “imagine 
being fatigued”; Nordgren, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 
2007, p. 77). The question thus arises exactly what condi-
tions are necessary for mental simulation to substitute for 
visceral experiences. Past research suggests that mental sim-
ulation requires a detailed representation of the simulated 
event (Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014) that recruits over-
lapping neural mechanisms that support perception and 
action (Ganis et al., 2004; Jeannerod, 2001). In our studies, 
we provided people with concrete cues (pictures in Studies 
1a-1b, specific questions in Studies 2-5) to prompt mental 
simulation. Thus, we show that abstract, semantic represen-
tations (e.g., feeling cold) can be translated into detailed epi-
sodic simulations (e.g., How does my body feel when I’m 
cold?), with the corresponding consequences for preferences 
and behavior.
People do not seem to generate detailed episodic simula-
tions automatically. In Study 1b, the effects on preferences 
were stronger when participants were instructed to imagine 
themselves in the pictures, compared with when they simply 
looked at the pictures. Previous literature (Keesman et al., 
2016) has also shown that mentally simulating eating a spe-
cific attractive food increases salivation compared with 
merely looking at the food. Although the mental simulations 
in these cases lasted only a few minutes at most, they affected 
preferences and behavior. Thus, mental simulation seems to 
require an explicit (but not necessarily lengthy) engagement 
with the specific stimulus that exceeds any spontaneous 
engagement evoked by looking at the stimulus. Future 
research could test whether interindividual differences exist 
in the extent to which people spontaneously generate mental 
simulations. Our results as well as previous research 
(Keesman et al., 2016) suggest that prompting people to 
mentally simulate leads to more elaborate engagement than 
it occurs in the absence of such prompts.
The question might arise why we consistently find assim-
ilative effects of mental simulation (e.g., people who simu-
late warmth feel warmer) and not contrast effects (e.g., 
people who simulate warmth notice a contrast to their cur-
rent experience and feel colder). We expected to find assimi-
lative effects because the literature has shown that mental 
simulation effects mirror the effects of the actual experience 
(see Kappes & Morewedge, 2016, for a review). Asking 
people to deliberately reflect on the fact that they were not 
currently in the simulated state could perhaps encourage 
contrast effects.
As mental simulation effects have been found for a large 
variety of actions (Kappes & Morewedge, 2016), we expect 
mental simulation to also be possible for a variety of visceral 
states. We found that simulation of being cold, warm, hun-
gry, or full affects preferences and behavior. People might 
also be able to simulate other visceral states such as thirst or 
fatigue. However, the results might not generalize to visceral 
states that people have not previously experienced, such as 
feelings of starvation or other extreme states. Presumably, 
the more familiar a given state, the more detailed simulations 
people would be able to generate.
We have demonstrated that mental simulation can affect 
preferences and behavior. Future research should test whether 
the effects of mental simulation have further downstream 
consequences. First of all, mental simulation might help 
reduce empathy gaps from hot to cold states or from cold to 
hot states. Through mental simulations, people might be able 
to anticipate what they want in alternative visceral states. 
Thereby, mental simulations might reduce preference incon-
sistencies (e.g., buying fattening food when shopping hungry 
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but preferring fruit and vegetables when less hungry) that 
can result from empathy gaps, when people cannot fully 
anticipate how their preferences will change when their vis-
ceral states change. Furthermore, mental simulations might 
enable bridging empathy gaps for others. Study 5 shows that 
people project their simulated states onto similar others. 
Future research could test whether people also project their 
preferences onto others, which might enable them to use 
simulation to anticipate others’ preferences and needs more 
accurately.
Taken together, mental simulation can substitute for 
actual experiences to an extent, and can thereby affect peo-
ple’s current preferences and behavior. Unlike making indi-
viduals aware that their preferences are biased by their 
current states (Nordgren et al., 2006), mental simulations 
provide an avenue by which people can mentally test what a 
different visceral state would feel like, and thus generate 
more accurate predictions about how it would affect their 
preferences. By engaging in their imaginations, people might 
thus reduce the empathy gap, and make better predictions 
about the wants and needs of other people and of their own 
future selves.
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Notes
 1. Participants in the warm condition felt marginally thirstier (M 
= 6.26, SD = 1.81) than participants in the cold condition (M = 
5.57, SD = 1.96), t(117) = 1.976, p = .051. Feeling thirsty had 
a marginally negative effect on preferences for warm activi-
ties, β = −.154, SE = 0.081, t(117) = −1.902, p = .060, 95% 
confidence interval (CI) = [−0.314, 0.006].
 2. In all studies, we report unstandardized regression coeffi-
cients. Variables were not mean centered.
 3. Participants in the warm conditions felt marginally hungrier 
(M = 4.71, SD = 2.59) than participants in the cold conditions 
(M = 4.13, SD = 2.37), t(240) = 1.844, p = .066. Feeling hun-
gry had no effect on their preferences, p = .281.
 4. Looking at the 2 × 2 interaction effects and main effects, the 
interaction of the between-subjects factors (visceral state and 
intensity) was significant, F(1, 297) = 10.889, p = .001, η2 
= .035, as was the interaction of preferences (warming vs. 
filling activities) and visceral state, F(1, 297) = 5.532, p = 
.019, η2 = .018. The interaction of preferences and intensity 
was not significant, F(1, 297) = 0.549, p = .460, η2 = .002. 
We found a significant main effect of intensity, F(1, 297) = 
52.590, p < .001, η2 = .150, as participants preferred filling 
and warming activities more when having simulated being 
hungry/cold (vs. warm/full). The main effect of state was 
marginally significant, F(1, 297) = 3.005, p = .084, η2 = .010, 
as participants preferred filling and warming activities more 
in the temperature conditions. Finally, we found a significant 
main effect of preferences, F(1, 297) = 52.284, p < .001, η2 
= .150, as participants preferred warming more than filling 
activities.
 5. The simulation condition did not affect participants’ choices 
of the sizes of the filler items (toothpaste, notepad, picture 
frame), all ts < 1.092, all ps > .277.
 6. The longer ago participants had last eaten, the larger their cho-
sen food portion sizes, F(1, 103) = 4.673, p = .033. How long 
ago they had last eaten a full meal did not affect their food 
portion size choices, F(1, 103) = 0.120, p = .729. The effect 
of simulation condition on food portion size choices remained 
significant when including both these covariates, F(1, 103) = 
7.405, p = .008.
 7. Participants in the full condition felt warmer (M = 5.03, SD = 
1.33) than participants in the hungry condition (M = 4.71, SD 
= 1.20), p = .036. Control participants (M = 4.96, SD = 1.24) 
felt equally warm as participants in the full condition, p = .658, 
and those in the hungry condition, p = .111. Feeling warm had 
a negative effect on participants’ current preferences for filling 
activities, β = −.093, SE = 0.044, t(199) = −2.113, p = .036, 
95% CI = [−0.180, −0.006], but not on their general prefer-
ences, β = .034, SE = 0.059, p = .565.
 8. We also computed the analysis testing for the effect of simula-
tion condition on momentary preferences, including the viv-
idness and the engagement items as covariates. Neither the 
reported vividness of simulations affected momentary prefer-
ences, F(1, 196) = 0.807, p = .370, nor the reported engage-
ment with the simulation task, F(1, 196) = 2.449, p = .119. 
Importantly, the effect of simulation on momentary prefer-
ences remained significant when including both these covari-
ates, F(1, 196) = 37.776, p < .001.
 9. We also tested for moderated mediation using the Process 
macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013), by pooling the momentary 
and general preference data and using timing as a moderator, 
focusing on participants who simulated being either hungry 
or full to facilitate interpretation of the results. We found a 
significant direct effect of simulation for participants report-
ing their momentary preferences (t = 7.30, p < .001) but not 
for participants reporting their general preferences (t = .864, 
p = .388). In addition, we found a significant indirect effect 
of hunger on momentary preferences (95% CI = [−0.745, 
−0.254]). Although there was no direct effect of simulation on 
general preferences, we found an indirect effect of hunger on 
general preferences, though it was smaller than for momentary 
preferences (95% CI = [−0.500, −0.075]). For ease of exposi-
tion, we present the momentary and general preferences data 
separately in the main body of the text.
10. There were no main or interaction effects on participants’ per-
ceptions of the other person feeling thirsty versus quenched, 
ps > .717, or feeling tired versus energized, ps > .326. On the 
perception of the other person feeling hot versus cold, there 
was no effect of simulation nor its interaction with similar-
ity, ps > .424, but there was an unexpected main effect of 
similarity, F(1, 196) = 6.064, p = .015, η2 = .030. Participants 
thought that a similar other felt warmer than a dissimilar other. 
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Although this main effect might reflect the psychological rela-
tionship between similarity and physical warmth (Steinmetz & 
Mussweiler, 2011), it is not part of our hypothesis.
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